Map 16 of Maps of SEA in the 1960s

Operation HUB

The 23rd TASS Tactics Board regularly looked for weaknesses in the network of roads that snaked through Laos .  In January 1967, the board resubmitted a recommendation for a new operation.  The plan called for attacks against new points on Route 911 and force more trucks out onto Route 23. 

The FACs wanted to create temporary chokepoints that were not ringed with AAA like the regular interdiction points.  Trucks delayed near those points could be attacked more.  Once the enemy brought in more AAA/AW, the FACs planned to abandon each new point and concentrate the airstrikes elsewhere.  

This plan was similar to successful attacks along Route 911 in early 1966.  The new plan included the additional objective of forcing more trucks onto the longer, less defended Route 23. 

The 1967 plan called for day strikes against a chosen road segment.  FACs would stay overhead throughout the day to prevent repairs.  Lamplighter, the C-130 flare aircraft, would replace the O-1s at dusk.  The 24-hour coverage over the damaged road would keep the road closed indefinitely.

The Nails also knew exactly where the first bombs of the operation should fall.  Just below the Chokes, all bypasses necked down to a single road.  Every southbound truck on Routes 911 and 912 used that one mile section of road. 

If the fliers could close that short piece of road, every truck driver would have to divert to Route 23.  Trucks that reached the Chokes on Route 912 would have to turn north on 911 instead of south.  These trucks would have to detour 120 miles to cover the 30 miles separating the Chokes and the transshipment center at Tchepone.

The North Vietnamese had one other option.  Drive the trucks as close as possible to the new choke point.  Then, using pack animals, cargo bicycles, and plain manpower, carry the cargo to trucks south of the damaged road. 

Shuttling the cargo was the more likely reaction.  The North Vietnamese had no desire to expose all their trucks to 90 more miles of the gauntlet in central Laos . 

Yet, clusters of their trucks above and below the new choke point would make lucrative targets for night armed reconnaissance missions and daylight strikes against truck parks just north of the point.  

With some "pride of authorship," the Nails suggested that the single point interdiction program be called the "Nailhole."  Seventh Air Force scheduled the Nailhole plan to start on 6 February 1967 .   However, early in February there were not enough aircraft available to devote to the plan.  The attack had to be delayed for more than a month.

Seventh Air Force Operation Plan 483-67 started the single point interdiction plan on 14 March 1967 .  This plan actually called for new attacks in the Ban Laboy Ford area, at FOXTROT and at GOLF, as well as at the point picked as the "Nailhole."  Airstrikes were limited to the Nailhole, however, because of the limited number of flare, FAC, and strike aircraft that could be dedicated to the plan.

Someone at Seventh Air Force renamed this spot the "HUB."  The Nails preferred the original name, but the HUB was a descriptive title.  The accompanying picture shows that the roads above and below the point spread out like spokes of a wheel from a hub.