Map 24 of Maps of SEA in the 1960s

At 8:00 p.m. on the evening of October 31, 1968 , President Johnson took the initiative once again.  “The order went to our Air Force and Navy to halt all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam as soon as possible, and within 12 hours at the latest.”   Thus, there was an agreement to halt one-half of the out-country air war.  The unacknowledged war raging in the Laotian panhandle was not directly affected by the agreement, but the indirect effects were overwhelming.

The reaction of the North Vietnamese was predictable unless they were actually ready to give up their goal of conquering South Vietnam .  In the absence of the American air presence, the North Vietnamese could restore all the damage done by the Summer Interdiction Campaign to the supply lines in the panhandle of North Vietnam .  In addition, the Communists could bring trucks, supplies, and fuel in large quantities down to the Laotian border in totally open, daytime operations.  Previous truces gave evidence of what to expect. 

Convoys moving into Laos would be considerably more organized than when they had had to run the gauntlet of USAF and Navy armed recce aircraft patrolling the North Vietnamese side of the border.  Since the North Vietnamese had established a record of taking advantage of any military benefits our policies and restrictions offered, other Communist initiatives were likely. For example, it made sense that they would build another major road network around the western edge of the DMZ.  Such a network would permit the Communists to operate unopposed down to the edge of the DMZ and avoid the American aircraft patrolling the supply lines in Laos south of the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes.  The North Vietnamese opened up the Ban Raving Pass just northwest of the DMZ, but they continued to put heavy emphasis on the main roads that had served them so well in the past.  In any case, the bombing restrictions offered major benefits and assistance to the North Vietnamese infiltrators.