B-57 Canberra Bomber

101393 USAF – ¾ front view of B-57 aircraft parked at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam.  May 1967.   U.S. AIR FORCE PHOTO.

I never worked any B-57s during the day. I worked them as Red Birds or Yellow Birds coming up from Phan Rang on the nights of 17 November and 23 November 1967. I liked adding a B-57, when available, to our night hunter-killer team, which normally consisted of my O-2 and a T-28 from the Zorros of the 56^th Air Commando Wing at NKP.  Sometimes as we searched a segment of the Trail, Alley Cat (the night ABCCC controller) would offer us a B-57, and I’d always welcome them.  I guess we rendezvoused  using our real TACAN coordinates (since the O-2 really did give the FACs a TACAN) and I suppose we must have turned on our shielded upper beacon.  Otherwise I don’t know how the B-57 crew would keep track of us, although once we flared, the site of the battle was obvious.  While we flew at about 4,200 feet (which was about 3,500 feet above the ground along the main Route 911 in the lower ground between Mu Gia and Tchepone, the T-28 loitered above us at about 5,000.  Seems like the B-57s said they were about 20,000, although that sounds high now that I think of it.

Anyway, all was quiet and pretty dark until my nav (usually Captain Bertram Bilton) spotted trucks.  We would flare and direct the T-28 against the trucks while the B-57 stayed high above.  You can see in the discussion below the more colorful description (which I wrote in 1980) of what followed.

While we enjoyed the benefits of having a B-57 overhead in the Enforcer role, the third aircraft increased the dangers of mid-air collisions where the strike aircraft are flying blacked-out and we generally flew dark as well once the rendezvous took place with out T-28. The Zorro pilot occasionally asked for a flash of our beacon if he lost track of our black aircraft flying in the dark.  We used altitude separation as our main defense against mid-airs. Sometimes the T-28 stayed below out altitude once the strike began, so our main concern tactic was to tell the Zorro geographically where we were from the target when he came down through our altitude and climbed back through after the strike.

When I cleared a Red Bird or Yellow Bird for attack from above, we and the Zorro scrambled off to the side, and I usually dropped a few hundred more feet when I was well away from the guns.  The B-57 usually dropped a funny bomb (as discussed below) into the mix without any of the three of us ever seeing each other.  A couple of years later—after FACs had been driven higher even at night when the out-country war had shifted from North Vietnam and Laos to Laos—one of Jim Roper’s friends, Thomas Dutton, was lost in a mid-air collision near Tchepone between his O-2 and a B-57.

* * * * * * * * * * *

Night Strike Aircraft Compared

Just as FAC aircraft differed in their capabilities, there were marked differences among the aircraft that attacked the trucks and guns at night in Steel Tiger.  One lesson was obvious. Jets that seldom cratered the road in clear weather in the daytime could not really be expected to hit a truck moving in the dark on the same road.

            Colonel Aderholt, the Air Force's greatest proponent of propeller-driven aircraft, told why he believed in the capabilities of the older aircraft. 

             The effectiveness of the A-26 and T-28 night recce/strike operations was due to their ability to deliver their weapons with a higher degree of accuracy than the jet fighter aircraft in SEA, coupled with their capability to remain on station or in their assigned areas for relatively long periods of time and with a useful payload.  The effectiveness of the night attack operations of the B-57 showed that certain types of current jet aircraft” also can be effective weapons systems.  The T-28, A-26, and B-57 have a common characteristic, which contributes to their accuracy of weapons delivery.  These three aircraft have low wing loadings, which permit them to deliver unguided ordnance at much shorter slant ranges than aircraft with high wing loadings, which require higher altitude for safe recovery from dive attacks.  In essence, the majority of USAF fighter/bomber and attack aircraft operating now in SEA have the same type of system for aiming and delivering ordnance, a manually depressed sight for obtaining lead angles.  The bombing results obtained by the A-26, T-28, and B-57 verify that this aiming system is much more compatible with these aircraft than with the F-105D and F-4C.

            The T-28, A-26 and B-57 because of their limited speed are extremely vulnerable when operated in areas heavily defended with AAA or in areas where they may encounter enemy interceptor/fighter aircraft.  These areas should be CAPed with high-speed fighters or attacked with high-speed fighter bombers. ^[i]

           

            Most Nail FACs agreed that the A-26s and T-28s were the easiest aircraft to work with at night.  The Nails also discovered that adding the B-57s (call signs:  Redbird and Yellowbird) as a third member of the hunter killer team was very comforting.  FACs assigned the “Enforcer” role to the B-57s, especially around FOXTROT, Ban Laboy and other heavily defended interdiction points.  As the FAC and the A-26 or T-28 patrolled the Trail, the B-57 orbited several thousand feet above.  Once the O-2 deployed a flare, the Yellowbird circled the shimmering light like a hawk waiting to pounce on a field mouse.  Then, if the gunners made the mistake of really “hosing down” the A-26 or T-28, the Enforcer tried to pinpoint one set of AAA and requested clearance for attack.

            Anytime the FAC cleared a Redbird or Yellowbird in “hot,” a wild scramble ensued in the black, night sky since none of the three pilots could see the other aircraft.  The FAC and the Zorro or Nimrod, determined to stay out of the way of the B-57's attack, dived toward the jungle to the side of the target.

Although neither the FAC nor the gunners ever saw the B-57, its shadowy presence was dramatically announced by the ignition of an M-35 or M-36 bomb.  Nicknamed “funny bombs” because of their strange combination of effects, the M-35 and M-36 incendiary bomb clusters combined the effects of napalm, incendiaries, and CBUs. These bombs were the most awe-inspiring ordnance the author witnessed in combat.

            A small flash of fire in the air near the flare signaled the ignition of a funny bomb.  From the side, the aerial fire appeared as a fiery fist, opening and growing as it descended toward the darkened jungle.  The view from the target must have been terrifying.  The flames spread over an area larger than a football field by the time the fire reached the ground.  Then scores of thermate bomblets exploded threatening anything in the area.

            Normally, the Nail and its T-28 or A-26 resumed the strike without additional problems.

            In addition to the quality of the aircraft and the aircrew, the ordnance load was a third key variable that determined the results of attacks at night.  The B-57s' reign as a top truck killer was based, to a great degree, on the destructiveness of the M-35 and M-36 bombs.  Lieutenant Colonel E.S. Smith, the 8th Tactical Bombardment Squadron commander, stated that truck kills by B-57s were four to five times higher when the M-36 funny bomb was available than when other ordnance loads were substituted. The 900-pound M-36 had 182 thermate bomblets that exploded on contact with the ground.  A single bomblet could set a truck on fire and destroy it. ^[ii]

            The B-57s' accuracy, matched with the area coverage of the M-35 or M-36, made the Redbirds and Yellowbirds the most effective jets on night attacks against the Trail.  The B-57s could have done more in Steel Tiger if they had been based at NKP instead of at Phan Rang Air Base, South Vietnam.  The flying times from Phan Rang reduced the B-57's time in the Steel Tiger North to about one hour on each mission. ^[iii]

 
  
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