US Navy A-4E Skyhawk
K-KE 64662 – WHERE:
North Vietnam
WHEN: 21 Nov 67
WHAT: Low angle left side view of a Navy A-4E aircraft, in flight
toward North Vietnam. It carries
a mixed ordnance load consisting of one “Bullpup” AGM-12 guided missile
and five high explosive bombs. U.S.
AIR FORCE PHOTO
* * * * * * *
* *
When I arrived at NKP in
early 1967, the Laotian dry season was in full swing. By late February, I was fully operational with a lot yet to
learn. We flew in pairs so new
FACs were scheduled with more experienced FACs.
I gained a lot of my FACing experience with A-4s.
My two favorite’s were the Chippies and the Juries. Seems like I
heard they were off the USS Ticonderoga.
They were so good that I soon concluded that if I were ever shot down,
I hoped it would be while working the Chippies or Juries because there was not
jet I’d rather have flying cover over me while we waited for the Sandies to
show up.
In a few cases, I was
straining to spot the inbound Skyhawks so the low FAC could begin the strike.
As the FAC, I estimated our location from the radial-and-distance polar
grid marked on my area map, then passed it to the inbound fighters as if I
were giving them a TACAN distance and radial from Channel 89 at NKP.
Here’s some words I wrote
in Crickets on a Steel Tiger in discussing some of the differences in bombing
accuracy I observed while directing more than 400 aircraft on strikes in Laos
and North Vietnam.
The Navy A-4 Skyhawks, diverted
often into the Steel Tiger, were the most impressive group of jets that the
Nails controlled in the spring of 1967. The
A-4 was designed primarily for the attack role and carried a good bomb load
for such a relatively small aircraft. The A-4's better overall accuracy was based on more than just
the capabilities of the bombing platform.
Variations in the rules governing the employment of the Air Force and
Nave aircraft influenced the accuracy of the bombs delivered.
As stated earlier, Air Force
jets were limited to a minimum altitude of 4,500 feet above the ground when
bombing in Steel Tiger. As a
result, bomb release points were significantly higher above and farther away
from the targets than were the release points of the low flying Skyhawks.
In addition, the Air Force concluded that repeated passes against
defended targets were the most dangerous for the aircraft and aircrews.
The basic Air Force policy, therefore, was to release all bombs on a
single pass. While additional
passes are more dangerous, they are also more accurate.
Multiple passes give the pilot the opportunity to learn wind
conditions, aircraft idiosyncrasies, etc., on the first pass.
The last bomb should be the best bomb dropped. In summary, while both Air Force restrictions had the
laudable goal of reducing aircraft and aircrew losses, the restrictions also
reduced the effectiveness of the unguided general-purpose bombs used in that
phase of the war.
The rules governing the length
of combat tours were the other main policy difference that influenced the
airstrikes in Steel Tiger. The
Air Force out-country pilot's tour length was based on surviving 100 combat
missions over North Vietnam, with missions in the Route Package VI area around
Hanoi being the most deadly. The
Navy pilot's tour length, however, lasted until his aircraft carrier finished
its assignment in the Gulf of Tonkin.
These rules meant that neither
pilot received any credit for missions over Laos. Ironically, the Navy pilots, whose tour lengths were not
affected by working in North Vietnamese airspace had to fly over North Vietnam
to reach Laos. Air Force pilots,
who needed to penetrate North Vietnamese airspace to log one of their 100
"counters," normally flew directly into Laos from Thailand or from
bases in the northern part of South Vietnam.
As a result, the system encouraged Air Force pilots to divert to North
Vietnam or rush through airstrikes in Laos to save enough fuel for a quick
"route recce" across the border into North Vietnam.
The hurried efforts turned the Laotian mission into a counter, but
tended to degrade both the accuracy and the effectiveness of the Laotian
strikes.
The FACs readily recognized
that the Navy pilots' motivation was entirely different.
They were obviously eager to work with the Nails.
The Navy pilots had no need to finish quickly
and could not take their bombs back onto the aircraft carrier.
If enough fuel and time were available, the Navy pilots dropped one
bomb at a time, using the FAC targets like a practice bombing range..
They appeared to work hard at improving their skills so they would be
better prepared for the next day's mission, which might take them back among
the heavy defenses around Hanoi. It
was not uncommon for the FAC's comments to be augmented by those of the flight
leader if a wingman got sloppy or failed to follow instructions.
Most FACs concluded that the overall accuracy of the A-4 was a direct
reflection of the intensified effort of its pilot.
