A Shau

The Project CHECO Report, The FALL OF A SHAU, originally published as SECRET on 18 April 1966 , barely six weeks after the historic battle. It is a story of great heroism and significant sacrifices by all services and our allies in the Vietnam War. The final day of battle, 10 March 1966 , included what is probably the most famous single flight/act by a USAF airman during the entire war.

That CHECO Report follows these introductory comments. I have attached some other documents I’ve scanned on this famous battle.

In May 1959 the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party [Lao Dong] decided to increase direct support to the Communist insurgency against South Vietnam . ^{^[i]} The North's previous support had been modest, consisting primarily of returning to the South some of the soldiers who had come north as part of the 1954 agreement to gather Viet Minh soldiers in North Vietnam .^{^[ii]} However, if the Lao Dong were to overthrow the South Vietnamese government, the North Vietnamese Communists had to find a way to move thousands of men and innumerable tons of equipment and supplies into South Vietnam . The Communists wanted the infiltration to be as covert as possible to minimize any outward appearance of violations of the 1954 declarations at Geneva .

The North Vietnamese could move troops and materiel by land, sea, or air, and the choices available in 1959 were limited.

The North Vietnamese started systematic use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1959. This action indicated that Hanoi 's leaders wanted to consolidate Communist control over the eastern portion of the Laotian panhandle prior to the beginning of the 1960s.^{^[iii]}

The initial usage of the Trail was haphazard. Small groups of infiltrators moved south, guessing at the routes that might lead to the proper area of assignment in South Vietnam . Transit time in Laos was normally at least 3 months. This was not efficient enough, however, to support Hanoi 's master plan.

In December 1960, the North Vietnamese government took over the direction of the war in South Vietnam and formed the Liberation Front. The Communists also organized the Trail.

They set up small transit camps, field hospitals, and supply dumps. Staging posts were a day's march apart. A guide led small groups of Viet Cong, usually between forty and fifty men, half-way to the next post. There, he handed over his troops to another guide and returned to his own base again. The new guide led the reinforcements to his own transit camp, and then half-way to the next one, and so on. Individual guides knew only their own tiny portion of the route, so maximum security was maintained.

The North Vietnamese Government was anxious to hide its involvement in Laos and South Vietnam . When another group of Viet Cong reinforcements was ready to move south, they were taken from their training camps by truck to assembly areas near either the Mu Gia or Ne Pa Pass. The soldiers turned over all personal belongings, papers, and anything else that would identify them with North Vietnam . They were given guerrilla equipment and the “black pyjama” uniform of the Viet Cong. The soldiers were often issued a khaki drill uniform to wear while traveling through “neutral” Laos . They returned that uniform and changed into the black one just before slipping into South Vietnam . ^{^[iv]}

^{^[i]} "United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos," United States Senate Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, lst Session, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970, 419‑420. (Hereafter cited as Kingdom of Laos Hearings.)

^{^[ii]} Passing the Torch, 149.

^{^[iii]} North Vietnam and PL, 70‑71.

^{^[iv]} Major Edgar O'Ballance. "The Ho Chi Minh Trail," Army Quarterly and Defense Journal (April‑July 1967), 106‑107. (Hereafter cited as "Ho Chi Minh Trail".)

As the United States became more active in the early 1960s in supporting South Vietnam against the threats from North Vietnam , one strategy was to set up a series of Special Forces camps near the border between South Vietnam and Laos (and probably more along the Cambodian border as infiltration routes were extended farther south into neutral Cambodia . The camps, which often had small teams of Green Berets (as illustrated by John Wayne’s movie on the Green Berets) with larger groups of Vietnamese troops, were set astride the major natural routes out of the mountains into South Vietnam . Thus, if North Vietnam was going to achieve large-scale infiltration of troops, munitions, and other supplies out of Laos through the jungle covered mountains along the border, they needed to eliminate these outposts. That is why you’ve heard of many of the border posts and routes because major battles in the early years were in and around these outposts: A Shau, Plei Me, Ia Drang (I’m not sure if we had an actual camp here in 1965 when this became a major battle ground near the border), Lang Vei, Khe Sanh, for example.

I lived in a bunker at Khe Sanh and flew out of that isolated base for a couple of weeks in the summer of 1967 and flew over the narrow A Shau Valley, which had become a major infiltration route in the intervening 16 months after the fall of A Shau. Khe Sanh and A Shau were very important strategic location, but they were terrible places for bases. We were never going to completely own the high jungle-covered terrain around the two bases. When the weather was decent, American airpower could hold off determined attacks, as we proved in the first few months of 1968 at Khe Sanh. When the clouds were down on the hilltops, the equation changed so that the vastly superior (in numbers, not quality of people) forces the North Vietnamese could mass nearby could be decisive if the weather didn’t break.

That is the story of A Shau in March 1966. The battle was lost, but a record of great heroism was established by Americans serving in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. I’ll send a second posting with more details on a couple of the many acts of heroism exhibited in those two fateful days in March.

A Shau/1966: Some Philosophy and Heroism

In the spirit of Jim Michener’s New Year’s Eve message about remembering the gentle heroes we left behind, including his friend, Major Michael O'Donnell, KIA, Rescue Helicopter, 1970, I think it is quite appropriate for us to reflect on battles such as A Shau 1966. I have scanned in a copy of the original Medal of Honor nomination for USAF Major Bernard Fisher. There are very few among us who haven’t heard about his heroic mission on 10 March 1966 . I have also included a copy of the Air Force Cross nomination for USAF Lieutenant Delbert R. Peterson for his unselfish heroism on 9 March 1966 . My guess is that most of you were like me, never having heard of his heroism until I read the CHECO report of The Fall of A Shau. His heroism is as much a part of our heritage as that of Bernie Fisher.

Note: Both nominations were scanned from poor copies I made from archived documents in 1979, so while I spent a lot of time trying to correct the scanning errors, a few may remain.

A Bit of Home-Grown Philosophy

We live in a time when the media and the Clinton administration regularly blur the line between right and wrong on issues both simple and complex. Most of us grew up and came of age in an era when it was appropriate to draw a line in the sand and move to the side one thought was right.

I bring this up because over the years I have seen some good people make some convoluted rationalizations to explain away something. In some cases they ended up taking stands on what I would consider the wrong side of the line dividing what was good for America and what has helped our enemies. I have learned that on complex issues, it is sometimes good to look around you and see just who you’ve lined up with and who’s on the other side of the line.

The following are the stories of two brave Americans I see when I look around at who we stood beside during the Vietnam War. These are two concrete examples of the heroism our people exhibited when called upon. There are tens of thousands of other Americans whose unselfish heroism put their names on the black granite Wall the TLCB visited this summer. So, as I look around with the perspective of 30 more years (which haven’t changed my mind from what I believed in the 60s), I look across and see the Jane Fondas and other apologists who served the cause of our country’s enemies. As I look around on my side of the line, I see the Bernie Fishers and the Delbert Petersons and the men and women of the TLCB. As I said to Paul Lee in the 1997 pre-TLCB days, be proud that you went and served where your country sent you. Whatever your job was, wherever you served, you didn’t flee your country’s call and flee to Canada like many of those standing on the side of the line with Jane Fonda.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

A Shau is one of several U. S. Special Forces camps located near the Laotian border in I Corps to keep watch on infiltration of enemy units into South Vietnam from the North. It has a triangular shaped fort with walls about 200 yards long with barbed wire perimeter defenses. A 2300 foot airstrip with pierced steel planking base is dust outside the perimeter. The camp is located at the base of a narrow valley some 20 miles southwest of the coastal city of Hue , and only about two and a half miles from the Laotian border.

On 5 March 1966 , two North Vietnamese Army defectors walked into Camp A Shau in Thua Thien Province and, under interrogation, reported that the camp would be attacked on 11 or 12 March. The defectors gave interrogators the location of the 325th Division Headquarters (seven kilometers east of A Shau), the 6th and 8th Battalions of the 325th Division and the coordinates of a rice cache. All of the locations given by the defectors were hit by air strikes. In anticipation of a probable attack, the camp was reinforced on 7 March with seven U. S. Special Forces personnel, 149 Chinese Nung troops, and nine interpreters. They joined the 10 Americans and 210 Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel already at A Shau.

At 0200 hours on the morning of 9 March, the camp was attacked with mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles, automatic weapons, and small arms fire. In the initial attack, two Americans were killed and 30 wounded; Vietnamese casualties were eight killed and 30 wounded. The barrage destroyed the supply area for the 380‑man camp. Medevac was requested along with air strikes. The enemy attack was broken off at daylight and the defenders began to repair and improve their defenses. (1)

During the night, the ceiling over the camp was 300 to 500 feet with visibility of five miles. No air strikes were flown due to the poor weather. In preparation for further enemy attacks, the I Corps commander requested that a U. S. Marine Corps standby force be alerted for airlift into the A Shau area if weather permitted and if the need arose. Also, two Chinese Nung companies, one at Hue and one at Da Nang., were standing by for helilift to the camp when the weather permitted. (2) The first air request was received at 0908 hours, but weather initially kept planes out of the area. (3)

At 1120 hours, 9 March an AC-47 was sent to the outpost. The crew was scrambled from bed, having flown the previous night. When the aircraft arrived over the camp, the pilot, Captain Willard M. Collins, was told by the ground forces that the camp was in imminent danger of being overrun. The ceiling was still around 400 feet, but Captain Collins and his co-pilot, 1st Lt Delbert R. Peterson, made two attempts to penetrate the ceiling under visual flight conditions. A third attempt was made at treetop level and the plane was successful in reaching the fort. Under intense enemy ground fire from automatic weapons, including .50 calibers, the plane completed one pass at enemy troops surrounding the fort and on its second pass, had the right engine torn from the mounts by ground fire. The other engine was silenced seconds later. The plane crash-landed on a mountain slope, sliding to rest at the base. One crew member, SSgt Foster, broke both legs in the crash. The crew prepared a perimeter defense around the wreckage of the plane and wounded‑crew member, and in fifteen minutes the enemy attacked. This was repulsed but a second enemy attack killed the Pilot, Capt Collins and SSgt Foster, the wounded airman.

A third attack began as a USAF H-43 rescue helicopter dropped down to pick up the crew. During this attack, Lt Peterson charged the enemy's .50 Caliber machine gun with his M-16 rifle and a .38 caliber pistol, to permit the rescue to take place. He was successful. The chopper picked up the other three survivors and took off under heavy enemy fire, leaving Peterson and the two dead men behind. (4)

When the word was: received that the AC-47 had been shot down, a flight of two A-1Es, led by Mayor Bernard F. Fisher, of the 1st Air Commando Squadron at Pleiku, was diverted to the scene. Locating a small hole in the overcast above five miles northwest of the camp, Major Fisher led his flight through the hole and down a mile‑wide valley to the camp. The ceiling was about 500 feet and enemy automatic weapons fire, including .50 calibers) was trained on the planes. Receiving instructions to destroy the AC-47, Fisher assigned the task to his wingman and went to the assistance of the besieged fort. Learning that enemy forces were preparing for a mass assault, he brought another flight of A‑1Es into the box canyon area and directed their strikes on enemy positions less than a half mile from the fort. ,When this flight had expended, he directed a CH-3C helicopter into the fort to evacuate badly wounded personnel. He then returned above the overcast and brought in two C-123s to make a perilous paradrop of needed medical supplies and ammunition to the defenders. As the C-123s made their drop of some 6000 pounds on target, Fisher and his wingman suppressed hostile ground fire by strafing. Earlier, two U. S. Army Caribous had made drops of supplies to the fort which landed outside the compound, but were later retrieved. (5)

Two B‑57s joined the battle later, being led through the hole in the overcast by Fisher, who by that time, was dangerously low on fuel. The B‑57s strafed and bombed enemy positions in the camp and around the AC-47 where numerous enemy troops were observed. (6) The AC-47 was destroyed along with its valuable mini‑guns around 1650 hours after napalm and bomb drops were observed making direct hits on it. In addition to the A-1E and B-57 strikes, two VNAF A-1H aircraft successfully penetrated the ceiling around 1330 hours, expending ammunition on enemy positions.

Throughout the daylight hours of the 9th, only 29 sorties could be flown in support of A Shau; 17 by the USAF, ten by the USMC, and two by the VNAF. The ground defenders, concerned about deteriorating weather and another enemy attack, repaired their defenses as well as they could and dug in for the night.

Starting around 0200 on 10 March, the enemy forces again launched a mortar attack against A Shau. The mortars, which had found their range the night before, rained shells into the compound with deadly accuracy, according to one survivor. This was accompanied by a torrent of machine gun and rifle fire. At around 0335, the camp radioed to a USAF C-123 flareship overhead that it was under full-scale assault. The attack continued without-let-up under the low cloud ceiling as the attackers made human wave assaults against the layers of barbed wire defenses outside the south wall of the camp. The enemy troops broke through the wire and breeched the south wall before daylight as U. S. Special Forces and Chinese Nung Tribesmen fought them off. At; this time there were also Vietnamese CIDG irregulars in the camp. The Americans and other survivors were forced to the north side of the compound and desperately waited for daylight and air support, if weather permitted. (7)

Two C-123s and one AC-47 were overhead throughout the night providing flare support. From 0515 until 0630, radar bombing was conducted by U. S. Marine jet aircraft providing 19 sorties. At 0705, one USMC A4 disappeared in the heavy overcast while flying air support and was reported missing. (8)

At 0730, the 1st Division (ARVN) and the on-site Forward Air Controller reported that radio contact with A Shau had been lost. Bombing was continuing through the cloud cover, however. The cloud cover at this time was solid and layered from 200 to 7000 feet. Contact was reestablished at 0807 by the FAC, who received a report that the camp was still holding and that the air strikes were keeping the enemy back. The north wall of the camp was held by the defenders while the Viet Cong occupied the south wall and half of the east wall of the triangular fort. Around 0950, in response to ground requests, the Forward Air Controller directed a napalm attack against the south wall. The defending forces asked for all the air support they could get. Unfortunately, the weather was still down to around 800 feet. At 1100 hours, the defenders reported that they would be able to hold their positions for no more than another hour or so. Shortly after, they radioed that; airdrops for resupply of ammo should not be attempted since they could not retrieve the bundles.(9)

At about 1115, a flight. of A-1Es were diverted to the camp. The flight was led by Major Fisher who had flown over A Shau the previous day. He learned from the ground that all friendly forces were concentrated in the northern part of the fort and that the other walls should be strafed. Mayor Fisher and his wingman, Captain Francisco Vazquez, started raking the walls with 20mm cannon. Another A-1E flight, led by Mayor Dafford W. Myers of the 602d Fighter Squadron from Qui Nhon, arrived on the scene and ,joined in the strafing passes. Major Myers' wingman, Captain Hubert King, took several hits, including one in the canopy, and he had to return to base due to limited visibility from the cockpit. On Myers' third pass over the fort at about 800 feet, he took at least three .50 caliber hits, including one in the engine. His windscreen was covered with oil, smoke filled the cockpit, and soon the whole aircraft appeared to be engulfed in flames. Under the radio directions of Major Fisher, Myers brought the plane into a wheels up crash landing on the wrecked and debris littered pierced steel plank (PSP) runway of A Shau. The plane burst into flames, when the belly tank exploded on landing, and skidded about 200 yards to the right side of the runway, veering off toward an embankment. Myers, only superficially wounded, evacuated the aircraft immediately, and ran for a weed covered ditch off the runway. (10)

Fisher called for a rescue helicopter and circled the downed aircraft with his wingman, Captain Vazquez. After being informed that it would take 15-20 minutes for the‑chopper to arrive and after estimating the extent of the ground fire would not permit the chopper to land, Fisher. decided to land his A-1E on the 2300 foot mortar‑shattered runway to pick up his fellow pilot.. At this time, around 1145, another A-1E flight, composed of Captains Dennie B. Hague and Jon I. Lucas, arrived on the scene, and prepared to cover Fisher's landing. (11)

Fisher made one attempt to land from the smoke engulfed north approach, touched down, quickly realized he could not make it, and took off again. Making a 180-degree turn with enemy automatic weapons trained on his plane, he swung around, landed on the other end of the runway, dodging empty oil drums, cans, and parts‑of Myers’ aircraft and brought the plane to a halt just off the edge of the runway. Turning in the dirt, he taxied at full speed, looking out his right window for signs of Myers. He watched enemy tracers coming at him and heard the plunk of bullets in his fuselage. He saw Myers waving from his weed hide‑out and brought the plane to a halt. Believing the downed pilot to be wounded, he started to unharness himself to go after him. Although he could not see Myers on the right side of the aircraft, Myers was making a 50-yard dash for the plane, with enemy bullets following him. Hague, Vazquez, and Lucas provided suppressing fire throughout the rescue attempt. However, by the time Myers was making his run to Fisher's aircraft, their guns were empty. (12)

Fisher pulled Myers into the plane head first, turned the plane around, and took off, flying at treetop level up the valley till he got enough airspeed to go up through the overcast. It was an extremely heroic feat, and Fisher was subsequently recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor. The A Shau strip was not considered safe for A-1Es even under normal circumstances. To land on its jagged, mortar-pocked surface among debris, with enemy troops all around and even firing from the hills above the clouds, took a tremendous amount of courage and skill. Myers' words to Fisher when he was pulled into the aircraft were: "You dumb S.O.B. now neither of us will get out of here". Myers later said that if he had any way of communicating, he would have told the fighters to call off the strikes, since the enemy automatic weapons were located and concentrated for a classical aircraft trap. (13)

Despite the desperate efforts of the defenders to hold A Shau, it was decided to evacuate survivors by helicopter and get out of the camp that evening. The estimated three enemy battalions of the 95B Regiment of the 325th Division were too much for the defending force in view of the poor weather, which restricted air strikes. On 10 March, although 210 sorties were flown in support (103 USMC, 67 USAF, 19 USN, and 12 VNAF), (14) bad

weather impeded their effectiveness and forced strike aircraft to low altitudes where their vulnerability was increased. (15)

At around 1700, U. S. Marine helicopters went in to evacuate the wounded, extracting 69 personnel. The camp was officially closed at 1745 hours on 10 March. The complement at A Shau originally consisted of the 17 Americans, 149 Chinese Nung mercenaries, and 219 Vietnamese irregulars. U. S: Special Forces personnel suffered 100% casualties - 5 killed and 12 wounded. Only 172 Vietnamese were evacuated, the rest being listed as missing in action, although many of these turned up later. It has been estimated that the Viet Gong lost about 300 to ground fire and estimated 500 killed by air strikes. In addition to the ground casualties, the

U. S.

lost one in the A-4 crash, two dead and one missing in the AC-47 crash, and four Marine crewmen missing after the crash of an H‑34 during the extraction Operation on the 10th.

The loss of A Shau was a substantial ground victory for the enemy, yet it was plainly evident that without air power there would have been no survivors. A B-52 strike planned for the 10th of March near the camp was cancelled when it was discovered that the strikes would be in the route of friendly personnel evacuating the camp. A B-52 raid was conducted at A Shau using CBU munitions on the 19th of March 1966 . Tactical air strikes against enemy positions at A Shau continued for the following week with aircraft strafing and bombing the enemy‑held installations of this former Special Forces camp.

There is some consensus among USAF pilots that the camp could have been saved if the defenders had been able to hold out for one more night. The weather cleared‑partially on the morning of the 11th, and under the clearer skies U. S. aircraft might well have been able to repeat the performance at Plei Me, where pinpoint napalm and bombing attacks on the camp's perimeter kept the enemy at bay. Unfortunately, this was not possible at A Shau.

General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam

, congratulated

U. S.

airmen who provided close support to A Shau's defenders. In a message to the 2d Air Division, General Westmoreland said: (16)

"...The air support provided by Marine and Air Force units at the recent battle of A Shau Special Forces Camp was equal to any in aviation history. The repeated heroic deeds of the transport, fighter, and helicopter crews and forward air controllers, accomplished under extremely adverse conditions, reflects the utmost credit on the crews themselves and their respective services ...."

Perhaps the most glowing tribute to the role of air power in the battle of A Shau came from one of the Special Forces defenders, Captain Tennis Carter, who said, "Without the air support you provided, we wouldn't have lasted one day. If you hadn't flown at all, the Special Forces wouldn't have blamed you. It was suicidal, but you carried out your mission anyway. I wouldn't have done it.”