Project CHECO Report
Second Defense of Lima Site 36
28 April 1967
FOREWORD
The
CHECO Special Report entitled "Defense of Lima Site 36" (published
This
attack of 17-19 February 1966, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and
"left little for them to exploit." Subsequent reports tended to
confirm that "although the communists had won the field, they may have lost
the battle."
The
following report "Second Defense of Lima Site 36" ends on a more
satisfactory note with the successful defense of the outpost, infliction of
heavy losses, and defeat of the attacking Communist forces.
Both
reports illustrate classic examples of the application of close air support in a
hostile environment.
SECOND
DEFENSE OF
"...No
question about
--
Lima
Site 36 (LS-36), a staging site for JOLLY GREEN Search and Rescue (SAR)
operations in
North
Vietnamese troops had overrun the site on 17-18 February 1966, but had been so
mauled by air strikes that they were unable to occupy it until
several days later._2/ The leader of the Meo tribesmen, Gen. Vang Pao,
and his guerrilla forces, were able, however, to recover the camp from the
communists on
In
late December 1966 and early January 1967, the North Vietnamese troop buildup in
the Sam Neua area (VH 0157) had been observed as a potential threat to Lima Site
36 (UH 4113), Lima Site 52 (VH 0581), and Lima Site 85 (UH 6860). 4/
Of the three, the enemy chose Site 36 for their first major attack of 1967
in that area, as they had in February 1966.
Regarding
their planning,
".
. . They reversed their usual procedure on this attack. Normally their assaults
come during the hours of darkness; however, this time they infiltrated into
position during the night and began their attack just about daybreak. For
several weeks Site 36 had been covered by a very low overcast during the day,
and probably the enemy figured that no tactical air could get in to give
support."
At
0600H, on
Within
minutes the major assault began, with the CP coming under attack from automatic
weapons and small arms from three sides, covering all major withdrawal routes
for the ADC forces. _7/ At that time, the weather was exactly as the
communists had hoped it would be—a solid overcast, a ceiling of 200 to 500
feet, with many of the surrounding peaks speared in the clouds. _8/
From
the south, the enemy rapidly closed to within 100 yards of the compound
and, by 0630H, other elements had broken into the northern portion of the
entrenchments which made up the final line of defense for the command post.
Of
the two American advisors among the 500 defenders at LS-36, one was killed
attempting to make his way to the radio shack. The other, barricaded there, was
able by 0650H to request air support. _9/ All in all, the 'situation at the site
appeared increasingly grim.
First
to respond to the call for immediate air support was Venom flight, composed of
four F-105s diverted from armed reconnaissance in the Steel Tiger area of the
Laotian panhandle. Venom flight arrived over Site 36, along with
Flying
Venom Lead, Lt. Col. Eugene 0. Conley,* commander of the 354th
Tactical Fighter Squadron at Takhli, Thailand, finally managed to find a small
hole some distance from the site, where he snaked his way between the peaks
toward the camp.
At continuing risk to himself, Colonel
Conley buzzed the battle scene. Because of low overcast--200 feet on his arrival--he could not
line up to deliver his ordnance, but made repeated passes directly over heads of
enemy and friendly forces alike. _11/
Even though unable to strike, appearance of the aircraft lifted morale of
ADC troops and unquestionably had a deterring effect on the enemy, until Venom
Lead was forced to rejoin his flight. _12/
*Lt.Col.
Dragonfly
21 and 22, A-1E aircraft from the 602d Fighter Squadron Commando (FSC), at
Major
Robert E. Turner, who was within one "counter" mission of finishing
his tour in
Another
A-1E pilot with the 602d FSC, Captain John C. Roberts, recalled Major Turner's
description of the radio briefing: _13/
"...he
said the American at the site was very excited; his contemporary at the site had
already been killed. The enemy force had already overrun about three quarters of
the compound, were inside the compound and firing at him. He was in a building,
but he still had; his radio and he had a shotgun there--he figured it was a last
ditch effort to keep them out of the building. He was asking for any kind of
help available."
Capt.
John D. Haney, Major Roberts' wingman in Dragonfly 22, said of
the situation: _14/
"...the
American on the ground sounded to me as if he really didn't think either of us
would get in there. We got in the general area of the outpost, and the TACAN at
Lima Site 85, 30 miles northeast was a little weak. Major Turner was able to get
an intermittent lock-on with his birddog--ADF--on the radio beacon at the fort.
He left me on top, about 8,000 feet. Weather was solid on down to the 200-foot
ceiling they'd given us at the camp.
"He
left me on top in a holding pattern so that he would know where to find me, and
penetrated on down. The tops of the mountains there, within about five miles of
the camp, go on up to about 56-5,900 feet. He made this general circling
approach with a vague idea where he was and managed to break out at 5,500 feet,
well below the. surrounding terrain but just over the outpost."
Major
Turner could see that the situation was as the controller had told him. The
enemy were on both sides of the runway, on the north slope of the hill where the
compound was situated, in the POL storage area, and in the trees encircling the
west side of the field. When he asked where to strike, he was told that anything
outside the compound itself and its ridgeline would be "fair game."
_15/
Major
Turner knew, also, that the ceiling precluded strikes by jet fighters and that
he would have to wait until A-1Es arrived from Udorn or
He
made several passes, firing rockets singly out of the LAU-32 pods and firing
short bursts from his 20-millimeter (mm) cannon to conserve his ammunition. _16/
Slowly he began to work the enemy down from the hill and across the runway. His
gunnery pattern, restricted by ceiling and terrain, was so low that often he had
to pull up, off his run, and into the clouds themselves to avoid trees and
hilltops. The ground controller described his work as "tremendous."
On
one occasion, when asked if he could get some enemy troops among the POL barrels
without burning the gasoline, he strafed with 20-mm fire, on his next run, up to
and around the barrels, and then resumed strafing the other
side. Later, five enemy bodies were counted in the POL area, with only two
barrels dented by glancing rounds. _17/
Major
Turner eventually "fired out" his ammunition, climbed on top of the
weather to locate his wingman, and with Captain Haney in trail, led the way back
to the camp. Captain Haney said: _18/
"...the
clear area--up to this 200-foot ceiling--was about a mile by a mile and a half.
It was just a constant
turn really, and after I had been through what turned out to be our gunnery
pattern, I just couldn't believe that he had been working down in there.
"He
stayed down in there to divide their fire, and probably kept me from getting hit
a lot more than I did. I fired out in about nine passes and was hit twice. Major
Turner was down there for, altogether, probably 25 passes."
Dragonfly
21 and 22 were, in actuality, over the target for the crucial one hour and five
minutes that made the difference between saving and losing the camp during the
initial assault. In that time, both aircraft received battle damage from heavy
and accurate ground fire--luckily not serious enough to force them to break off
their attacks.
These
two A-1Es expended 1,600 rounds of 20-mm cannon fire, four 100-pound white
phosphorous bombs, 42 high-explosive 2.75-inch rockets and eight 2.75-inch
rockets with white phosphorous heads. _19/
By
the time the relief A-1Es began to arrive, their attacks drove most of the enemy
troops back from the compound and runway and into the treelines some hundreds of
yards away. In their firing passes, Major Turner and Captain Haney made strikes
on enemy troops within 50 yards of the Meo ADC defenders. This allowed the
friendly forces to counterattack and restore the defensive perimeter in the
command post area. _20/
Butterfly
44, an airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC), had arrived before Dragonfly 21
and 22 finished. He began to direct the incoming flights through clearing
weather. As the ceiling started to break, Firefly 11 and 12, two A-1Es, came in
on the tail of the departing Dragonfly flight to work over the drainage ditches
and treelines near the runway.
Firefly
expended six LAU-32 pods of 2.75-inch rockets, four MK-47 white phosphorous
bombs, 1,200 rounds of 20-mm and 300 rounds of 6.62-mm fire from M-3 minigun
pods, and four WP rockets in 30 minutes on the target._21/ They, in turn, were
followed throughout the day by overlapping flights of F-105s (the weather
cleared completely by
The
American aircraft delivered more than 62 MK-47 bombs, 27 CBU-14s, four BLU-23
incendijel cans, and expended 61 LAU-32 pods (seven rockets each) of high
explosive armor piercing rockets, 28 "Willie Peter" rockets,
10,300 rounds of 7.62-mm machinegun fire, and 14,000 rounds of 20-mm
fire. _22/
The
fight was still not over, although the immediate threat had subsided. Continued
air support and the Meo defenders had driven the Communist assault forces away
from the perimeter and allowed the slightly damaged airstrip to be reopened.
Confirmed enemy body count in the close-in defenses had risen to more than 40
(mostly attributed to the work of Major Turner and Captain Haney), but the North
Vietnamese remained in force around the camp. Sniper fire prevented effective
patrol action by Gen.Vang Pao's tribesmen. _23/
The general arrived during the day to take over command of
this ground situation. Although he suspected that more than 100 had been killed,
with the attacking force badly hurt and dispersed, there was no safe way for him
to send patrols into the woods to get a better body-count or ascertain the full
situation._24/
Butterfly
44, whose perspective of the day's action was better perhaps than most, felt
that the site would be held if the enemy did not regroup and attack during the
night, and if the weather remained good on the morning of
Lt.
Gen. William W. Momyer, commander, Seventh Air Force, considered security of
Lima Site 36 throughout the night of sufficient importance that he directed the
Lamplighter (C-130 Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center), diverted
from its normal Steel Tiger orbit into the Barrel Roll area to cover the camp
more effectively. The Nimrod A-26s of the 606th Air Commando
Squadron at
The
night passed uneventfully, however, and the morning dawned clear enough to begin
working the surrounding area. Blue Boy, the English speaking Meo FAG (Forward
Air Guide) on the ground, brought in Dragonfly 21 and 22; Sandy 1, 2, 3, and 4;
and Firefly 11 and 12, from 0645H through 0920H, to blanket the nearby woods and
other likely places for troop concealment._27/ An enemy 82-mm mortar opened at
UH 434180 but it was quickly knocked out by the
Perhaps
the most significant event of the day occurred later in the afternoon. A search
for enemy bodies, after the previous day's strikes, yielded ingress routes
carefully drawn on a detailed map of the area.
Gen.
Vang Pao, in studying this map, concluded that the North Vietnamese (and some
suspected Chinese communists), were unfamiliar with the territory and had been
guided on their infiltration. If this were true, and one or more of the guides
had been killed, then many of the enemy might try to retrace their steps in an
effort to withdraw and regroup. Accordingly, the General directed an observer to
fly in the FAC airplane, to comb and recomb suspected lines of exfiltration,
with the objective of locating sizable groups of the enemy force._29/
Soon
after
in a canyon-like, heavily-jungled swale
not far from one of the infiltration lines. Butterfly called for a strike and
when Firefly 15 and 16 (diverted from a fragged target before takeoff at
".
. . We arrived on scene—the weather was pretty good—talked to the local FAC,
Butterfly 44, and he marked an area, a kind of box canyon a little bit less than
a kilometer from the actual compound of
Although none of the flight was hit during the strike, they
drew heavy fire, probably from automatic rifles, which substantiated the
estimate of a sizable group under the jungle canopy. Butterfly 44 was
"elated" with the"devastating effect of this attack on the enemy
element."_32/
During their 35 minutes on target, Firefly expended 12
CBU-25s, eight MD-47s, two BLU-23s and two LAU-32 pods, plus 1,600 rounds of
20-mm cannon fire and 4,500 rounds of 7.62-mm ammunition, all in the relatively
confined area of the canyon. _33/
Prompt,
determined action by the A-1E and F-105 pilots in saving Lima Site 36 and its
defenders from almost certain destruction brought official praise from the Air
Attache in the U.S. Embassy at
".
. . We would like to express our appreciation for the quick reaction on the
request for emergency air support in defense of L.S. 36.
"The
determination displayed by the pilots of the Dragonfly, Firefly,
"Continued
response to such urgent requests should allow us to thwart the enemy's
intentions in this area and, hopefully, maintain the security of L.S. 36 and
85."
In
addition to Lt. Col. Eugene 0. Conley having been recommended for the Air Force
Cross, preparations were being made to request a similar award for Major Robert
E. Turner, and the Silver Star for Capt. John D. Haney, for their efforts during
the morning of
Distinguished
Flying Cross citations were being prepared for certain pilots in other
Dragonfly, Firefly, and
Lt.
Col. William F. Cunningham, 602d FSC commander
Lt.
Col. James F. Dinwiddie
Maj.
Lemuel D. Horton
Maj.
John S. Hamilton
Maj.
Sandy A. Zevin
Maj.
William E. Day
Capt.
George G. Anderson
Capt.
Randal B. Webb, Jr.
Capt.
John C. Roberts
Capt.
Robert L. Russell
1st
Lt. Steven D. Henning
*Through an oversight, Venom flight was omitted from the
official message. The AIRA's praise was intended to include specifically the
F-105 pilot in Venom Lead who made the first low altitude penetration into the
site.
Unquestionably, the selfless actions of
these men in response to this emergency turned the enemy's hopes for an
"annihilation" into a decisive and critical victory for the friendly
forces. Comparative casualty figures showed that the Meo ADC defenders had eight
killed (plus one American KIA) and 24 wounded, of which nine required medical
evacuation. An official body-count indicated 43 enemy--nearly all on
the site itself--had been killed in action (KIA). Subsequent agent reports,
however, showed an estimated 250 KIA._35/
Because
of its location deep within enemy-controlled territory, the continued security
of Lima Site 36 (along with LS-85) remained questionable. If
The U.S. Air Attache (USAIRA) in
"...We
feel that the enemy will continue to pressure Site 36 but as long as we can
count on prompt and sustained close air support, when needed, we can hang on to
or at least be able to conduct an orderly withdrawal . . .."
FOOTNOTES
(Documents
as noted provided in one copy to AFCHO and in DTEC file copy.)
1.
(S) Interview with Col. John E. Bridge, Director of Intelligence, 7/13AF,
by Capt.Melvin F. Porter,
with
2.
(S) Project CHECO Special Report, "The Defense of
3.
(S) Msg, JANAF Attache,
1-67, 070432Z Jan 67, Doc. 1.
4.
(S) Ibid; (S) Msg, OUSAIRA,
5.
(S) Interview with
6. (C) Field Operational Rpt,
TFW to 7/13AF, 160835Z Jan 67, Doc. 4.
7. (C) Ibid.
8. (C) Ibid.
9. (C) Ibid.
10. (C) Msg, DCR 7/13AF
11. (C) Field Operational Rpt,
12. (C) Ibid.
13.
(S) Interview with Capt. John C. Roberts, 602d FSC,
14.
(S) Interview with Capt. John D. Haney, 602d FSC,
cited as Interview with Capt. Haney.) Doc. 7.
15. (S) Ibid.
16.
(S) Interview with Capt. Roberts, Doc. 6.
17.
(S) Interview with Capt. Haney, Doc. 7.
18. (S) Ibid.
19. (C) Msg, 432d TRW to AIG 913, OP-4,
FASTEL 00131, 0603452 Jan 67, Doc. 8.
20.
(C) Field Operational Rpt,
21.
(C) Msg, 432d TRW to AIG 913, OP-4, FASTEL 00131, 0603452 Jan 67, Doc. 8.
22.
(C) Ibid; (S) Msg, DCDR 7AF/13AF
67, Doc. 9.
23.
(S) Msg, JANAF Attache,
0704322 Jan 67, Doc. 1.
24.
(S) Msg, DCR 7AF to 7AFTSNAB, subj: FRESH BREEZE SITEREP Nr 295,
Doc. 10.
25. (S) Daily Operations Rpt (FAC)
Butterfly 44,
26. (S) Msg, DCR 7AF/13AF
Doc. 9.
27. (C) Msg, 432d TRW to AIG 913, OP-4,
FASTEL 00131, 0603452 Jan 67, Doc. 8.
28. (S) Msg, 7/13AF
SITEREP Nr 296,
29.
(S) Interview with
30.
(S) Msg, 7/13AF
Nr 296,
31.
(S) Interview with Captain Roberts, Doc. 6.
32.
(S) Msg, 7/13AF
SITREP No 296,
33.
(C) Msg, 432d TRW to AIG 913, OP-4, FASTEL 00131, 0603452 Jan 67, Doc. 8.
34.
(S) Msg, AIRA to Cdr 7AF, AIRA EMB 00063, 1109502 Jan 67, Doc. 13.
35.
(C) Field Operational Rpt,
with Capt Haney, Doc. 7.
36.
(S) Msg, USAIRA,
Security, AIRA 00047, 100100 Jan 67, Doc. 14.