When researching Crickets on a Steel Tiger at the Air War College in 1979-1980, I excerpted part of Appendix A of the a document that covered the AAA threat in Laos at the beginning of Commando Hunt in 1968.  So this isn’t a complete document but talks about capabilities and ranges of the AAA threat and shows typical coverage of 37mm guns and above along the main routes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail through central Laos .  JHB

OFFICE OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS

HEADQUARTERS, 7th AIR FORCE

COA MEMORANDUM 68-13

1 NOVEMBER 1968

. . EMENT OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN IGLOO WHITE AND COMMANDO HUNT

Prepared by

JOHN W. SHERMAN III, GS-15

NEWTON A. WILSON , GS-14

Released by

DR. ROBERT N. SCHWARTZ, Chief, Office of Operations Analysis

This memorandum represents the views of the authors and can be changed or withdrawn at any time. It DOES NOT necessarily express USAF policy.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  

DOD DIR. 5200.10

COPY 20 OF 40 COPIES                                                                      COA-68-693

APPENDIX A

1.0  GENERAL ENVIRONMENT

The portion of Laos in which the Commando Hunt campaign will be conducted is made up of areas formerly identified as Steel Tiger E & portions of F, with extensions, and roughly parallels the western border of North Vietnam, including the road system entering Laos at Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes which generally follow routes 911-9 (the "Eastern Corridors”) and 23 (the “Western Corridor"). The Commando Hunt area is outlined in Figure A-1 which relates it to radars, navigational aids, and other locations.

Figure A-2 provides an array of North Vietnam (NVN) anti-aircraft (AAA) artillery weapons reported to be active or potentially active in Laos . Figure A-3 is a plan view of the Commando Hunt area showing reported locations of NVN AAA weapons, during a 10 day period in November 1968.

2.0  NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND RADAR BOMBING FACILITIES

As Figure A-1 shows, adequate navigational aids are provided for aerial operations in Laos . These include MSQ-77 facilities at Nakhon Phanom (NKP) in Thailand and at Quang Tri* and Hue-Phu Bai in South Vietnam . The MSQ-77 radars are essential to the BLACK CROW operational concept presented in the paper to which this is an appendix.  In Southeast Asia (SEA) the MSQ-77 is primarily used for radar bombing. Other radars called GCIs, are located at NKP, Ubon, and near Da Nang . These are used primarily for tanker and strike force management. At the altitudes proposed for BLACK CROW operations, terrain masking is not considered to pose a problem over most of the area. This topic is discussed elsewhere in this paper.

* Essential details regarding this site should be revised according to SAC Det. 15 plans.

Note: The crosshatched section above Saravane represents the Echo and Foxtrot Sections of Steel Tiger.  The two parallel lines from the middle to the coast (near GCI Waterboy) represents the DMZ between North and South Vietnam.  JHB

3.0 AAA WEAPONS IN Laos

 The 7th AF DIO estimates that in Laos at operating altitudes greater than 10,000' above ground level (AGL) the greatest threat from AAA weapons  is likely to be from 57mm guns (Figure A-2). With radar control the effective range of the 57mm is extended but use of ELINT equipment can reduce this advantage. The self destruct altitudes for^- rounds fired from 23mm and 37mm guns may exceed 10,000' AGL but aimed fire in this range is generally not accurate. An 85mm threat has not yet been established in Laos , although there are some reports of such fire, and there is evidence that 85mm guns may be located in NVN areas which extend into Laos near Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. In general, the operating environment above 10,000' AGL appears relatively permissive. Figure A-3 outlines n representative distribution of AAA weapons for a recent period based upon ground fire reports. The radii plotted represent 37mm, 57mm, and 85mm envelopes seen in plain view.

Because of the great mobility and tactical flexibility of NVN AAA weapons in Laos , this distribution should be considered as representative only. Reports of fire from the ground ("ground fire" reports) are regularly updated, but redistribution of NVN AAA weapons can easily be accomplished before the reporting system can identify the initial positions and coverage. For this reason "iso-flak" models are not considered to be of particular utility, as these models have not solved the problem of the rapidly reconfigurable weapons distribution upon the iso-flak curves are based

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The numbers on the lower line represent the millimeter diameters of the shells fired by those AAA weapons.  JHB

This isn’t very well marked.  The top road is Route 15 coming out of North Vietnam into Mu Gia Pass. The second by where I’d written in 85 (for 85mm circle) is Route 137 coming out of North Vietnam over the Ban Karai Pass and into Route 912 in Laos . The nearly E/W road is Route 9 that crossed into South Vietnam near Khe Sanh. The 57 represents a 57mm circle. The next road was in Tigerhound and probably enters South Vietnam at the top of the A Shau Valley. The line along the left represents the Bomb Line in Central Laos . We weren’t to bomb west of it.  JHB