When
researching Crickets on a Steel Tiger at the
Air
War
College
in
1979-1980, I excerpted part of Appendix A of
the a document that covered the AAA
threat in
Laos
at the
beginning of Commando Hunt in 1968. So
this isn’t a complete document but talks about capabilities and ranges of the
AAA threat and shows typical coverage of 37mm guns and above along the main
routes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail through central
Laos
.
JHB
OFFICE
OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
HEADQUARTERS,
7th AIR FORCE
COA
MEMORANDUM 68-13
1
NOVEMBER 1968
.
. EMENT OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN IGLOO WHITE AND COMMANDO HUNT
Prepared
by
JOHN
W. SHERMAN III, GS-15
NEWTON
A.
WILSON
,
GS-14
Released
by
DR.
ROBERT N. SCHWARTZ, Chief,
Office of Operations Analysis
This
memorandum represents the views of the authors and can be changed or withdrawn
at any time. It DOES NOT necessarily express USAF policy.
DOWNGRADED
AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD
DIR. 5200.10
COPY
20
OF
40 COPIES
COA-68-693
APPENDIX
A
1.0
GENERAL
ENVIRONMENT
The
portion of Laos in which the Commando Hunt campaign will be conducted is made
up of areas formerly identified as Steel Tiger E & portions of F, with
extensions, and roughly parallels the western border of North Vietnam,
including the road system entering Laos at Mu Gia
and Ban Karai passes which generally follow routes
911-9 (the "Eastern Corridors”) and
23 (the “Western Corridor"). The Commando Hunt area is outlined
in Figure A-1 which relates it to radars,
navigational aids, and other locations.
Figure
A-2 provides an array of North Vietnam (NVN) anti-aircraft
(AAA) artillery weapons reported
to be active or potentially active
in
Laos
. Figure A-3 is a plan view
of the Commando Hunt area showing reported locations
of NVN AAA weapons, during a 10 day period in
November 1968.
2.0
NAVIGATIONAL
AIDS AND RADAR BOMBING FACILITIES
As
Figure A-1 shows,
adequate navigational aids are provided for
aerial operations in
Laos
. These
include MSQ-77 facilities at Nakhon
Phanom (NKP) in
Thailand
and at Quang
Tri* and Hue-Phu
Bai in
South
Vietnam
. The
MSQ-77 radars are essential to the
BLACK CROW operational concept presented
in the paper to
which this is an appendix.
In Southeast Asia (SEA) the MSQ-77 is primarily used for radar bombing.
Other radars called GCIs, are located at NKP, Ubon,
and near
Da
Nang
. These
are used primarily
for tanker and strike force management. At
the altitudes proposed for BLACK
CROW operations, terrain masking is not considered to pose a problem over most
of the area. This topic is discussed elsewhere
in this paper.
*
Essential details regarding this
site should be revised according to SAC Det. 15
plans.
Note: The
crosshatched section above Saravane represents the Echo and Foxtrot Sections
of Steel Tiger. The two parallel lines from the middle to the coast
(near GCI Waterboy) represents the DMZ between North and South Vietnam.
JHB
3.0
AAA WEAPONS IN
Laos
The
7th AF DIO estimates that in
Laos
at operating altitudes greater than
10,000' above ground level (AGL) the greatest threat
from AAA weapons is
likely to be from 57mm guns (Figure A-2). With radar control the effective
range of the 57mm is extended but use of ELINT equipment can reduce this
advantage. The self destruct
altitudes for-
rounds fired from 23mm and 37mm guns may exceed 10,000' AGL but aimed fire in
this range
is generally not accurate. An 85mm threat has not yet been established in
Laos
,
although there are some
reports of such fire, and there is
evidence that 85mm guns may be located in NVN areas
which extend into
Laos
near Mu
Gia and Ban Karai
passes. In general, the operating
environment above 10,000' AGL appears relatively permissive. Figure A-3
outlines n representative distribution of AAA weapons for a recent period
based upon ground fire reports. The radii plotted represent 37mm, 57mm, and
85mm envelopes seen in plain view.
Because
of
the
great mobility and tactical flexibility of NVN AAA weapons in
Laos
, this
distribution should be considered as representative only. Reports of fire from
the ground ("ground fire" reports) are regularly updated, but
redistribution of NVN AAA weapons can easily be accomplished before the
reporting system can identify the initial positions and coverage. For this
reason "iso-flak" models are not
considered to be of particular utility, as these models have not solved the
problem of the rapidly reconfigurable weapons
distribution upon the iso-flak curves are based
63
The
numbers on the lower line represent the millimeter diameters of the shells
fired by those AAA weapons. JHB
This isn’t very well marked.
The top road is Route 15 coming out of
North Vietnam
into Mu Gia Pass. The
second by where I’d written in 85 (for 85mm circle) is Route 137 coming out
of
North Vietnam
over the
Ban
Karai
Pass
and into Route 912 in
Laos
. The nearly E/W road is Route 9 that crossed into
South Vietnam
near Khe Sanh. The 57
represents a 57mm circle. The next road was in Tigerhound
and probably enters
South Vietnam
at the top of the A Shau Valley. The line along
the left represents the Bomb Line in
Central Laos
. We weren’t to bomb west of it. JHB
