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Jimmie H. Butler
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FORWARD AIR CONTROLLING Bulletin # 47 29 Aug 66
FORWARD AIR CONTROLLING 1.
One of the most effective applications of airpower in our counter-insurgency
effort in 2.
In order to work effectively as a FAC, you must thoroughly understand the
capabilities and limitations of the strike aircraft you direct and the troops
you support. You are not a trained infantry officer but you can develop a good
comprehension of ground force. procedures by forming close associations with the
people you are supporting and studying Army publications. The FAC is the pivotal
member of the strike team consisting of himself and the strike aircraft flight
leader. He possesses a target within defined limits and, with the cooperation of
the flight leader, he must employ the fighters to achieve maximum effectiveness.
The employment of the fighters is the responsibility of both the FAC and the
flight leader. If a dangerous situation develops during the attack, the strike
can be withdrawn by either the flight leader or the FAC. 3, At this point, without going into target
acquisition,
let us the FAC assume that the FAC has a
target and a flight of strike aircraft. The FAC has a responsibility to the flight
leader to describe the target situation and surrounding area, and provide
current intelligence as it.
affects the strike. He must describe the
target, point out the positions of the friendly troops and coordinate with
artillery and other air operations in the area. The FAC stores up a tremendous
knowledge of his area by his daily flights over it and by personal contact with
ground troops. The FAC must digest the target and then, using his full
imagination, communicate each aspect of the target to the strike pilots so
that the fighter crews see the target
in the same context as the FAC. The FAC must
reduce his sight picture
of the target to those items readily
visible to the fighters at their higher altitude and airspeed. 4. The actual marking of the target is, to
some degree, a misnomer The FAC may provide adequate target identification by
verbal description. A smoke rocket or grenade may be used as a common point of
reference; however, often a good landmark is available from which the target can
be described. In this case a mark is not necessary. The mark gives away the
intended target and the element of surprise is lost. Normally 3 or 4
minutes
elapse between target marking and the first attack. The enemy uses this time to
disperse and take advantage of passive defenses. However, in the case of
specific enemy locations such as gun emplacements or bunkers, or when friendly
troops are in close proximity to the target, there is no substitute for an
accurate mark. 5.
In order for the FAC to act as a controller and as the eyes of the strike crews,
he must position himself to meet two basic requirements. a.
The FAC should be able to see the fighter
aircraft at all times, If weather or smoke preclude visual reference, it is
imperative that the FAC see the fighter on final approach to the target. Since
the FAC shares the responsibility for avoiding a mid-air collision, visual
reference is of paramount importance. Also the FAC must be sure that the fighter
is lined up on the correct target. High on the list of items that can ruin a
good day is for a FAC to allow one of his fighters to drop ordnance off-target
in a friendly position. b.
The FAC must be able to see his target at all times. He must see the target
to detect any enemy movement or ground fire and to insure that the fighters are
on the proper axis of attack. 6. There are several methods for the FAC
to position himself to meet the above requirements. a.
The simplest method is to establish an
ordinary racetrack pattern with the axis parallel to the axis of the fighters’
final approach heading Taking into consideration wind, timing of the fighter
passes and compliance with the two basic requirements of positioning, the FAC
actually chooses a holding space to occupy. If the fighters change their attack
heading, the FAC must change his holding airspace so as to
avoid. interference. Holding altitude varies with the situation but is normally
between 1,000 feet AGL (above ground level) and 3,000 feet AGL. When evaluating
the risk against the results, there is little to be gained by flying lower.
As much as possible, close surveillance should be accomplished prior to
the airstrike. Flying at a lower altitude will only increase exposure to battle
damage. b.
The second basic method of orbiting the target applies to low altitude ordnance
delivery. (Napalm, CBU low angle strafe.) This is a small circular pattern
directly over the target. This is a dangerous technique if moderate or heavy
automatic weapons fire is encountered. However, if the FAC has done his homework
with his respective intelligence officer, he will be aware of potential enemy
action in the target area. For this pattern a minimum of 2,000 feet AGL is
recommended This will permit the strike aircraft to vary attack headings and
still be able to locate the FAC quickly on final. 7. Following the initial pass by the
flight leader, the FAC must direct subsequent attacks to insure adequate target
destruction. One of the best methods is to provide adjustments in reference to
the last ordnance on the target. Corrections should be given in meters from the
last hit in relation to a distinguishable landmark, with directions in compass
headings. This will reduce the possibility of confusion when fighters vary
attack headings. Some easily distinguishable landmarks are canals, houses,
trails, tree lines, tree groups, contrasting coloration and cloud shadows The
FAC must always start his description from a readily identifiable object and
move the fighter pilot's eyes from there to the desired impact area. For
example. "From the last hit go southeast across the light green rice paddy, a house with a tin
roof." With these tools, the FAC can give the strike pilots a specific
adjustment prior to the time that the fighter rolls in on final attack. The
information must be given quickly and curtly so the inbound pilot will have time
for a question if he does not immediately pick out the target. The FAC must
provide a specific target for each pass, properly matching the target to the
ordnance whenever possible. In other words, the FAC must plan the efficient
distribution of ordnance. 8.
The last strike responsibility of the FAC is the bomb damage assessment (BDA).
The BDA is simply what it implies, a word picture of the damage inflicted on the
target. "Five houses destroyed; seven houses damaged; two large sampans
sunk; one large secondary explosion from a sampan due to strafe; encountered
automatic weapons fire, position destroyed--bomb; 40% target coverage. Remarks:
Excellent Bombing accuracy." With the exception of the percent of target
coverage, it is self-explanatory. The percent of coverage is a combination of
actual target coverage, total destruction of the target, and a grade on the
ability of the fighters. For example, the actual percent of target coverage
would be inaccurate if all of the ordnance fell within the target limits but
completely off the specific intended targets. The FAC must ask himself,
"Did the fighter place the ordnance where I directed?" The fighter
strike can be no better than the direction received. First, the percent of
target coverage must reflect the actual target coverage; second, it must be
weighed in respect to the percent of effective ordnance; and third, the results
must be evaluated against the type of ordnance delivered. Fifty percent coverage
with strafing is nowhere near as destructive as fifty percent coverage with GP
bombs. The classical method for the FAC to get the BDA is to reenter the target
area following the strike and examine the damage. This is dangerous, and BDA is
not worth taking a hit. If the FAC has done his work correctly, he will have
nearly completed the BDA simultaneously with the completion of the strike. There
may be occasions such as friendly forces under attack, which will require
accurate and precise BDA. In this case it may be necessary to take a close look
at the target to be sure of results. These instances are rare and this technique
should be avoided except when absolutely necessary. 9. Some of the above comments have been extracted from a
report submitted by Captain Thomas F. Seebode, who recently completed a FAC tour
with the 22 TASS operating in the IV Corps area of the Mekong Delta. Our thanks
to Captain Seebode for his observations and comments. Documenting this
experience is a valuable contribution to the theatre indoctrination program in
SEA. FLOYD HERBERT, Lt Colonel, USAF Commander
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